The Prescriptive Jurisdictional Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law: Judge Learned Hand\u27s Requirement of a  Substantive Anticompetitive Effect by Kelley, Michael F.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
10-1-1991
The Prescriptive Jurisdictional Reach of U.S.
Antitrust Law: Judge Learned Hand's Requirement
of a "Substantive Anticompetitive Effect"
Michael F. Kelley
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Inter-American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael F. Kelley, The Prescriptive Jurisdictional Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law: Judge Learned Hand's Requirement of a "Substantive




REACH OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW: JUDGE




I. INTRODUCTION ... ....................................................... 195
II. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW: THE SHERMAN ACT ...................... 196
III. JURISDICTION OVER TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITY BY ALIENS ................... 197
A. Constitutional Lim itations ....................................... 197
B. Limitations Under International Law ............................. 199
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL SCOPE OF U.S. JURISDICTION IN ANTITRUST CASES ..... 205
V. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES .......................... 209
A . A lcoa: The Opinion ............................................. 210
B. The "Substantive Anticompetitive Effect" Requirement ............ 215
VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES ....................... 227
VII. POST-ALCOA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS ............... 235
V III. C ONCLUSION ......................................................... 248
I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust law has frequently
been criticized, especially abroad, as being an institutional exercise
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
of "legal imperialism." Few would argue that jurisdiction is re-
stricted to cover events which occur within the territory of a sover-
eign state. In the realm of U.S. antitrust law, however, both U.S.
courts and commentators lack a consensus as to the extent of juris-
diction, especially with regard to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Cen-
tral to the problem is a friction between the prescriptive jurisdic-
tional restraints of international law and the broad language of the
antitrust statutes which seemingly encompass any commercial ac-
tivity related to the United States.
Defining the jurisdictional reach of United States antitrust law
involves three essential issues: (1) whether the United States, as
sovereign, has the power under international law to exercise pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over certain acts of foreigners abroad; (2)
whether Congress has the power, under the Constitution, to enact
laws dealing with such foreign acts; and, (3) whether the Sherman
Act's prohibitions intend to cover the allegedly illegal foreign ac-
tivity in question. These inquiries involve the interpretation of
Judge Learned Hand's controversial and widely misunderstood
"effects" test for the exercise of "transnational" jurisdiction as es-
poused in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa").1
This Comment defends Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa and
maintains that it is consistent with the objective territorial princi-
ple of international law, as long as the test is read to require a
"substantive anticompetitive effect" on U.S. foreign commerce.
The proper exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act requires actual proof of a "substantive anticompetitive effect"
caused by foreigners abroad. Thus, a constituent element of the
offense charged must occur in the United States, as was the case in
Alcoa. Read otherwise, the Act takes on the character of an overex-
tended body of commercial tort law.
II. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW: THE SHERMAN ACT
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) character-
izes U.S. antitrust law as being the legal embodiment of the na-
tion's commitment to a free market economy.2 The two basic phil-
osophical tenets underlying the antitrust laws are: (1) that the
1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS (Nov. 10, 1988), reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 899 S-3
(1988).
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competitive process in the marketplace must be preserved to en-
sure the most efficient allocation of the world's finite resources,
and (2) that the protection of the full and vigorous operation of
competitive market forces will maximize consumer welfare.3 Thus,
preservation of the market's competitive structure, rather that the
protection of each individual competitor, is the goal of antitrust
law.4
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act ("Act")3 are the United
States antitrust laws of principal concern in this study. Section 1
declares it a felony to contract or conspire to restrain trade or com-
merce among states or with a foreign nation. Section 2 states that
it is also a felony to monopolize any part of such trade.
III. JURISDICTION OVER TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITY BY ALIENS
A. Constitutional Limitations
The power of Congress to enact any statute, such as the Sher-
man Act, must be enumerated under the United States Constitu-
tion.6 Such congressional power is derived from the Commerce
Clause which provides Congress with the power to regulate com-
merce between the States and with foreign nations.7 The only limit
imposed upon Congress's regulatory power in this context is that a
nexus exists between the regulated activity and United States com-
merce. Apart from this requirement, the United States Supreme
Court has described congressional power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce as complete in itself, plenary, and limited
only by the Constitution.8
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the
broad scope of the Commerce Clause and the corresponding con-
gressional power to regulate trade covered every kind of commer-
3. While other antitrust philosophies and goals have been advanced, the maximization
of consumer welfare is, or should be, the most enduring objective for this legal discipline.
For an in-depth analysis of the proposition that the only legitimate goal of American anti-
trust law is the maximization of consumer welfare, see ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
4. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (antitrust laws are
designed to protect competition, not competitors).
5. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1990).
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 196-97 (1824).
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cial transaction.9
United States courts must apply congressionally enacted law
even if the application defies customary international law.10 This
does not immunize Congress or any other actor from the conse-
quences of an international law violation. Although U.S. laws may
permit such an actor to engage in a certain type of conduct, the
actor remains subject to penalty in the international arena. Ac-
cordingly, in an effort to minimize potential conflict, U.S. courts
follow a rule of statutory construction which mandates an interpre-
tation consistent with international law unless a contrary interpre-
tation is inescapable.11 Indeed, in the Paquette Habana2 case, the
Supreme Court stated, "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction. . ... ,'s In the Alcoa decision, Judge Hand
warned against a broad reading of the Sherman Act without regard
to the internationally accepted customs which limit the reach of
one nation's powers over another."
Thus, United States courts have traditionally incorporated
and followed customary international law despite the absence of
any congressional or constitutional mandate to do so. As a result,
when a particular case has international implications, identifying
the international legal customs is a paramount concern."
9. Id. at 193-94. The United States Supreme Court described congressional power to
regulate foreign and interstate commerce as follows:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to
be governed. This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution. . . .If, as has always been understood,
the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specific objects, is plenary as to
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations ... is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government ....
Id. at 196-97.
10. Id.
11. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). As early
as 1804, the Supreme Court stated, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... " Id. at 117-18.
12. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
13. Id. at 700.
14. 148 F.2d at 443.
15. One commentatpr sums up the United States domestic treatment of international
law as follows:
[N]either the constitutional grants to Congress and the federal courts, nor any
act of Congress, declared or necessarily implied that the law of nations was in-
corporated as self-executing domestic law, or that it had the status of law of the
United States rather than of the states. Nevertheless, from our national begin-
nings both state and federal courts have treated customary international law as
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B. Limitations Under International Law
International law derives from customs and treaties which na-
tions recognize as legally binding. 6 The international community
has acknowledged various bases upon which a state may exercise
legal jurisdiction, as well as limitations upon such exercise. 17 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized similar sources of in-
ternational law in international disputes.18 In this context, "juris-
diction" refers to "prescriptive jurisdiction" which involves a sov-
ereign state's competence and capacity under international law to
apply domestic law to an international dispute.19 In 1935, research-
incorporated and have applied it to cases before them without express constitu-
tional or legislative sanction.
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1557
(1984).
16. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TE.ATISE 4-5 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
8th ed. 1955).
17. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally regarded
as the authoritative statement of the sources of international law. Articles 38 provides the
following sources of law to the International Court of Justice for purposes of resolving inter-
national disputes before it: (1) international conventions; (2) international custom; (3) gen-
eral principles of law that civilized nations recognize, and (4) subject to Article 59, judicial
decisions and highly respected scholarly works as subsidiary means to determine rules of
law. Article 59 states that "the decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case." Statute of the International Court of
Justice, arts. 38, 59, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945).
18. In the case of Paquette Habana, the Court stated that:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judi-
cial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations;
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
19. In § 401, the American Law Institute defines the different categories of jurisdiction
in the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as follows:
Sec. 401. Categories of Jurisdiction
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process
of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceed-
ings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or to punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by use
of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.
RESTATEmENT (THImD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) [here-
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ers in international criminal jurisdiction, working under the aus-
pices of the Harvard Law School, identified two theories address-
ing a state's right to exercise its jurisdiction. 0 Under the first
theory, international law must explicitly provide the authority for
the state to competently apply its laws. The second theory, a more
liberal approach, holds that the absence of an express prohibition
by international law empowers, through negative implication, a
state to freely apply its jurisdiction. 1
In the case of the S.S. Lotus,2 2 the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice noted these two competing theories and ultimately
favored the second one. The Court resolved the issue in favor of
the Turkish government, holding that a state may exercise juris-
diction over foreigners within its own territory as long as no princi-
ple of international law prohibits such an exercise .2  The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the successor of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, provided additional support for the S.S. Lo-
tus rationale in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. 24 The Bar-
celona decision, however, indicated that there are some implied
limits on a state's ability to assert its jurisdiction. 25
inafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
20. RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, WITH COMMENT, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435
(1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention].
21. Id. at 467-68.
22. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
23. The Court provided an extensive analysis of the issue:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a state from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to
acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permis-
sive rule of international law. . . . Far from laying down a general prohibition
to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory,
it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State re-
mains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
24. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 105 (Feb.
5).
25. The International Court of Justice agreed that states have "wide discretion," but
also suggested two levels of restraint regarding that discretion:
It is true that, under present conditions, international law does not impose hard
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The 1935 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, which identified five principles that nations accept as justi-
fications for the exercise of jurisdiction, is a useful guide for deter-
mining the limitations acknowledged in Barcelona Traction.26 The
five principles are the territorial principle, the nationality princi-
ple, the protective principle, the universality principle, and the
passive personality principle. Under the territorial principle, the
courts must determine jurisdiction by referring to the place where
the offense occurred.27 The nationality principle provides that ju-
risdiction hinges on the nationality or national character of the
person committing the offense.2 8 The third principle, the protec-
tive principle, allows jurisdiction where the offense threatens the
state's interests.2 Pursuant to the universality principle, the
court's jurisdiction depends upon the location and custody of the
offender.3 0 Finally, the passive personality principle provides that
the victim's nationality or national character is the determining
factor for the court's exercise of jurisdiction."'
and fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction in such mat-
ters (and there are of course others-for instance in the fields of shipping, "anti-
trust" legislation, etc.), but leaves to States a wide discretion in the matter. It
does however (a) postulate the existence of limits-though in any given case it
may be for the tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that case;
and (b) involve for every state an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint
as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a for-
eign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly
appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another State.
Id. pars. 70, at 105.
26. Draft Convention, supra note 20, at 445. The five principles of the Draft Conven-





31. Id. Regarding the acceptance of these principles, the introductory comment to the
Draft Convention had the following to say:
Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded as of primary impor-
tance and of fundamental character. The second is universally accepted, though
there are striking differences in the extent to which it is used in the different
national systems. The third is claimed by most States, regarded with misgivings
in a few, and generally ranked as a basis of an auxiliary competence. The fourth
is widely though by no means universally accepted as the basis of an auxiliary
competence, except for the offence of piracy, with respect to which it is the gen-
erally recognized principle of jurisdiction. The fifth, asserted in some form by a
considerable number of States and contested by others, is admittedly auxiliary
in character and is probably not essential for any State if the ends served are
adequately provided for on other principles.
Draft Convention, supra note 20 at 445.
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A state or nation's right to exercise jurisdiction over all per-
sons, objects, and property within its territorial limits is well set-
tled under international law. 2 This right, otherwise known as the
32. The THmD RESTATEMENT describes the limits of a State's prescriptive jurisdiction in
the following way, which, depending upon circumstances, may be broader or narrower than
under the principles stated in the Draft Convention:
Section 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that it
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other
state interests.
THrmD RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at 237-38.
Section 403, "Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe," states:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such juris-
diction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activ-
ity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regu-
lation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, le-
gal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulat-
ing the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Sub-
section (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
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territorial principle, is the most frequently cited basis for the exer-
cise of prescriptive jurisdiction, particularly with regard to crimi-
nal violations."3 Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this inter-
national precept in 1812, calling it "exclusive and absolute." 4
Although the territorial principle per se has achieved universal
acceptance, 5 legal controversy has emerged regarding its applica-
tion. As comment c of section 402 of the Third Restatement ex-
plains, the controversy surrounds not simply whether a person or
property is properly deemed present in a nation's territory, but
also whether that presence is necessary at all.36
From this controversy, two forms of the territorial princi-
ple-the "objective" and "subjective"-have arisen.3 7 The subjec-
tive territorial principle establishes the state's jurisdiction for con-
duct commenced within the state but completed or consummated
abroad; the objective territorial principle establishes jurisdiction
over conduct commenced outside of the state's territory but con-
summated within its territory.38 Due to the penal nature of the
Sherman Act," one can infer that the criminal applications of the
greater.
Id. at 244-45.
33. Draft Convention, supra note 20, at 480-84.
34. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Justice
Marshall provided a resolute opinion on this principle:
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tion upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sov-
ereignty, to the same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its
own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
Id. at 135.
35. See Draft Convention, supra note 20, at 480.
36. THaD RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402, cmt. c at 238-39.
[I]n some circumstances there may be a controversy as to whether a person or
property can properly be deemed present in the state's territory for purposes of
jurisdiction, or whether the territorial principle can be satisfied without the
physical presence of the person or thing being subject to jurisdiction.
Id.
37. Draft Convention, supra note 20, at 484.
38. Id. at 484-88. Regarding the objective territorial principle, one commentator has
observed "a State may exercise penal jurisdiction over a foreign national in certain types of
cases where a consummating act within the State's territory was a constituent element of a
crime committed abroad." George H. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639-40 (1954)[Hereinafter Haight] (citing
Draft Convention, supra note 20, at 487-503).
39. See Haight, supra note 38, at 640.
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territorial principle are pertinent to the transnational reach of U.S.
antitrust law. Despite the plausibility of this inference, some au-
thors remain concerned about the civil nature of the Act's domes-
tic proceedings.4 0 Others have answered these concerns by arguing
that the domestic manifestations of the Act are irrelevant for pur-
poses of international law. Moreover, commentators have charac-
terized the Act's civil proceedings as unusually penal in nature.'1
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which provides a civil action for
treble damages, is more akin to a criminal penalty than an ordi-
nary civil remedy.2
Emanating from the objective territorial principle, the "effects
test" for prescriptive jurisdiction has played an important role in
international law. In short, the "effects test" allows a state to exer-
cise jurisdiction where the results of the conduct manifest them-
selves inside the state's territory, regardless of the place the con-
duct occurred.
The S.S. Lotus decision produced a classic statement of the
effects doctrine .' The Lotus, a French ship, collided with a Turk-
ish ship, the Box-Kourt, on the high seas, killing eight Turkish na-
tionals.4 The Turkish Government brought criminal proceedings
for manslaughter against Lieutenant Demons, the lookout officer
on board the Lotus.45 The French Government argued that the
Turkish courts did not have jurisdiction, under principles of inter-
national law, to prosecute Demons. The Permanent Court, holding
that Turkey had the right to exercise jurisdiction under the cir-
cumstances, asserted the importance of effects for conferring juris-
diction.' Lieutenant Demons's presence (or lack thereof) inside
Turkish territory was not essential. In the Court's view, for pur-
poses of jurisdiction, an event has taken place within a country's
territory "... if one of the constituent elements of the offence,
40. Id.
41. Id.; R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust
Laws, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 147-48 (1957).
42. See Jennings, supra note 41, at 148.
43. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
44. Id. at 10. The rule in Lotus as applied to collisions at sea has been changed by the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 11, and the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, Article 97, both of which reserve penal and disciplinary
proceedings in such cases to the authorities of the state in whose vessel the defendant
served or, if different, the state of his nationality.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 23.
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and more especially its effects, have taken place there. '4 7
The Permanent Court's perception of "effects" was that "[t]he
offence for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been prose-
cuted was an act . . . having its origin on board the Lotus [or, in
France], whilst its effects made themselves felt on board the Box-
Kourt [or, in Turkey]. These two elements are, legally, entirely in-
separable, so much that their separation renders the offence non-
existent. '48 Thus, the Lotus opinion limits the effects which can
permit the exercise of jurisdiction to those which comprise an es-
sential element of the crime. A broader holding might produce an
extension of the territorial principle of jurisdiction to cover any
imaginable conduct. Naturally, such an "extraterritorial" extension
would be logically inconsistent with the territorial principle.49
Under the Act, the characterization of the United States asser-
tion of jurisdiction as "extraterritorial" has resulted in confu-
sion-especially when the conduct or the actors, or both, are
outside United States territory. The effects doctrine, however, clar-
ifies the confusion by justifying the Act's reaching conduct and ac-
tors outside United States territory when the requisite effects in-
side the United States are present.50 As such, the exercise of
jurisdiction is not "extraterritorial;" rather it is "transnational," as
are the effects which the prohibited conduct produces.
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL SCOPE OF U.S. JURISDICTION IN
ANTITRUST CASES
The attempted application of the Sherman Act to interna-
tional trade dates back to the American Banana"1 decision in 1909.
In this case, American Banana, an Alabama company, claimed that
United Fruit, a New Jersey corporation, had violated the Sherman
Act by monopolizing and restraining the banana trade between
Central America and the United States.5 2 The defendant, pre-
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 30.
49. See Jennings, supra note 41, at 160.
50. In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984), the court criticized the inaccurate practice of referring to the effects doctrine as an
"extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction." Id. at 923. The court recognized that such a
description is improper because prescriptive jurisdiction may exist if sufficient territorial
effects on United States commerce are present. Id.
51. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
52. Id. at 354.
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vented the plaintiff from competing by seizing his plantation and
halting construction of his railway. These acts were carried out
with the cooperation of Costa Rican officials and soldiers. Plaintiff
turned to the United States Court for relief claiming a violation of
the Sherman Act."
The Court, rejected the complaint finding no case arising
under the Sherman Act. The Courts reasoning was twofold: First,
the acts were sanctioned by the local government and therefore,
were not torts at all; and second, because the acts were committed
outside the United States, the Sherman Act was not applicable .
4
The American Banana decision has been cited as authority for
the argument that the antitrust laws can only be applicable when
the subjective territorial principle is satisfied. If this is so, however,
(i.e., if the case is read to say that effects can never be the basis for
jurisdiction) it has been effectively overruled. 5 A more compelling
argument would be that there was no jurisdiction in American Ba-
nana because any effects that may have been felt in the United
53. Id. The specifics of the case are as follows: In accordance with the laws of the
United States and Colombia, McConnell started a banana plantation in Panama (then a
part of Colombia) and began building a railway which would be the exclusive means of
export from the plantation. Soon thereafter, the Governor of Panama allegedly recom-
mended that Costa Rica administer the territory through which the railroad was to run. The
plaintiff believed that United Fruit instigated this recommendation. Then, the defendant
and the Costa Rican government, supposedly at the defendant's inducement, interfered with
McConnell's operations. McConnell soon sold his interests to the plaintiff. One month later,
again allegedly at the instigation of the defendant, Costa Rican soldiers and officials seized a
part of the plantation, thereby ceasing its operations and stopping the construction of the
railroad. Soon thereafter, one Astua, a third party, initiated an ex parte proceeding in a
Costa Rican court, and obtained a judgment declaring the plantation to be his. The plain-
tiff, however, alleged that the proceeding was not within the jurisdiction of Costa Rica, and
was contrary to its laws and void. United Fruit's agents then bought the property from
Astua. The plaintiff alleged that the damage he suffered was that he was deprived of the use
of his plantation and the railway, plantation and supplies were injured, and that the defend-
ant drove purchasers out of the banana market by outbidding competitors and compelled
producers to come to its terms; thus preventing the plaintiff from buying for export and
sale. American Banana argued that the defendant violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 354-55.
54. With regard to this notion, Justice Holmes made the following statement, indicat-
ing his extreme concern with overreaching jurisdiction:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done. . .. For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the ac-
tor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which
the other state concerned justly might resent ....
213 U.S. at 355-57.
55. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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States were unrelated to the plaintiff's injury and cause of action.
Since any injuries to the plaintiff occurred abroad and were not
related to effects on the U.S. market, the Court was not required to
address issues of effects and objective territoriality. Two years
later, however, the Supreme Court faced the effects issue. Justice
Holmes provided the very language relied upon by Judge Hand in
Alcoa and asserted that the objective territorial principle is a
proper basis for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. In
Strassheim v. Daily," Justice Holmes stated that: "Acts done
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing det-
rimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of
the harm as if [it] had been present at the effect . ... 
Thus, the United States does not adhere exclusively to a sub-
jective territorial approach to prescriptive jurisdictional determi-
nations. In United States v. American Tobacco Co.," the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act's prohibitions
applied to a British company that contracted in England with a
U.S. tobacco company to ensure that the competitors were to limit
their business to their respective home territories." Clearly, the ju-
dicial departure from American Banana was underway, at least to
the extent that the Sherman Act applied to a foreigner's participa-
tion with United States parties in a conspiracy based in the United
States even though the formal execution of the illegal agreement
occurred abroad.
In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation
Co., 60 American and Canadian railway and steamship companies
were found to have entered into an illegal scheme whereby the
companies agreed to, and effectively excluded independent trans-
portation lines as factors of operation between the United States
and Canada." While the defendants, relying on American Banana,
argued that the Sherman Act could not be extended to cover their
foreign carriage activities,62 the Court disagreed stating that:
This is but saying that laws have no extra-territorial operation;
but to apply the propositions as defendants apply it would put
56. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
57. Id. at 285.
58. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
59. Id. at 172, 184.
60. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
61. Id. at 103.
62. Id. at 99-100.
1991] 207
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the transportation route described in the indictment out of the
control of either Canada or the United States. These conse-
quences we cannot accept. . . . If we may not control foreign
citizens or corporations operating in foreign territory, we cer-
tainly may control such citizens and corporations operating in
our territory, as we undoubtedly may control our own citizens
and our own corporations.6
In Thomsen v. Cayser,6" foreign shipping line owners were ac-
cused of charging discriminatory rates on shipments between New
York and South Africa. The foreigners were operating according to
an agreement that was reached in England. The Court, following
the Pacific & Arctic case, held that the foreign owners were subject
to the Sherman Act because "the combination affected the foreign
commerce of this country and was put into operation [in the
United States]." 65
Similarly, in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,6 the Court
distinguished the circumstances in American Banana from the
case then at hand by stating:
Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
into by parties within the United States and made effective by
acts done therein. The fundamental object was control of both
importation and sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both in-
ternal and external trade and commerce therein. The United
States complain of a violation of their laws within their own ter-
ritory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of
something done by another government at the instigation of pri-
vate parties.
67
Sisal Sales involved a scheme between U.S. banks and the sole
Mexican selling agent of sisal to the United States. The plan was
undertaken to control the sisal trade between the United States
and Mexico, which supplied more than eighty percent of the
binder twine used for harvesting grain crops in the United States. 8
Since the U.S. and foreign defendants had "brought about forbid-
den results within the United States," jurisdiction was found to
63. Id. at 106.
64. 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
65. Id. at 88.
66. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
67. Id. at 276.
68. Id. at 272-73.
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exist under the Sherman Act. 9 The facts and outcome differ from
American Banana. The plaintiff in Sisal Sales complained of a
substantial injury which was a violation of the Sherman Act as evi-
denced by the effects in U.S. territory. On the other hand, the
plaintiff's injuries in American Banana occurred exclusively
abroad.
V. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
The Alcoa 70 case, considered the furthest departure from the
American Banana case and the decision exhibiting the broadest
transnational reach of the Sherman Act, is the seminal judicial
opinion applying the so-called "effects" doctrine.
Judge Learned Hand's 1945 opinion essentially provides that
prescriptive jurisdiction under the Sherman Act may be exercised
in situations where foreign nationals acting abroad are shown to
have: (1) intended to affect U.S. commerce, and (2) caused an an-
ticompetitive effect on such commerce.7 ' This "intent" and "ef-
fects" test has been the subject of great controversy because the
test lends itself to numerous interpretations. It has been a consid-
erable stumbling block for courts which have consequently failed
to develop a consistent standard.
The confusion may stem from the lack of consensus on how
far the jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust law should go. Judicial
attempts to redefine or interpret the effects test have created a
prolific menu of descriptions which would be appreciated by the
student of semantics. For those involved with the law, however, the
various characterizations have caused considerable difficulty. For
example, the "effects" test has been expressed in the following
ways: "the combination affected the foreign commerce of this
country"; 72 "though there is no showing as to the extent of com-
merce restrained, [the contract] deleteriously affected [U.S.] com-
merce 1 ;7 "a direct and influencing effect on trade . . . between the
United States and foreign countries";7 4 "a conspiracy . . . which
69. Id. at 276.
70. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. Id.
72. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917).
73. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949).
74. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio,
1949), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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affects American commerce; 75 and "a substantial and material ef-
fect on our foreign and domestic commerce."7 "
An in-depth analysis of the Alcoa opinion will be undertaken
to determine the "effect" necessary to trigger the application of
Judge Hand's test. Relevant post-Alcoa decisions will then be dis-
cussed and measured for their worth as valid law vis-a-vis the Al-
coa standard.
A. Alcoa: The Opinion
In Alcoa, 7 the United States Government charged the Alumi-
num Company of America (Alcoa) with monopolization of inter-
state and foreign commerce in the manufacture and sale of "vir-
gin" aluminum ingots in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The United States also alleged that Alcoa and Aluminum Limited
(Limited), a Canadian corporation, formed a conspiracy to restrain
such commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Act.78 Limited was
incorporated in Canada to take over Alcoa's properties located
outside the United States.7 9 Limited participated in the "Alliance,"
a Swiss-based international cartel composed of French, German,
Swiss, and British aluminum producers.8 0 Despite significant con-
nections of ownership and control between Alcoa and Limited,
Judge Hand recognized that the two companies were formally sep-
arated,"' that they had not coalesced in their operations, and that
Alcoa had not participated in the international aluminum cartel.8 2
The question was whether the Sherman Act could be applied to
invalidate a foreign cartel when its only connection to the United
States was the importation of aluminum ingot to the U.S. market.
The Alliance's original agreement, alleged to be in violation of
the Sherman Act, was completed in 1931 and provided for the for-
mation of the cartel under which a Swiss corporation would issue
75. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
76. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cases
(CCH) 1 70,600, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
77. Since a quorum of six justices of the Supreme Court could not be obtained, the case
was certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as a special statu-
tory court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
78. 148 F.2d at 421.
79. Id. at 439.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id. at 440.
82. 148 F.2d 416, 442 (2d Cir. 1945).
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shares, essentially representative of an aluminum production
quota.83 Each shareholder was limited to a specific quantity of pro-
duction measured by the number of shares it held, but was free to
sell its allotted quantity at any price. The corporation fixed a price
every year at which it would purchase any part of a shareholder's
quota that the shareholder did not sell.8 4 This agreement, however,
was silent as to whether it extended to sales made in the United
States."'
The 1931 agreement was supplanted in 1936 with an agree-
ment which substituted a system of royalties for the quota sys-
tem.88 Each shareholder was to have a free fixed quota for each
share it held, but was required to pay a royalty to the Alliance
graduated progressively in proportion to any excess production
above the sum of its quotas; such royalties would then be divided
among the cartel members in proportion to their shares.8 This
agreement did not explicitly state that unsold inventory would be
purchased by the Alliance; but one provision was thought to have
impliedly recognized such an obligation. 8 Although the 1936
agreement, like the 1931 agreement, was silent as to imports into
the United States, "all the shareholders agreed that such imports
should be included in the quotas."88
Thus, Judge Hand was faced with the issue of whether Sher-
man Act jurisdiction existed with regard to an agreement between
foreign corporations.8 0 The court then stated that the focal point of
the jurisdictional inquiry should be whether Congress intended to
impose liability upon the conduct of foreign actors, and whether
the Constitution permitted it to do so.91 In framing the inquiry in








90. The jurisdictional question was posed in the following fashion:
Did either the agreement of 1931 or that of 1936 violate § 1 of the Act? The
answer does not depend upon whether we shall recognize as a source of liability
a liability imposed by another state. On the contrary we are concerned only with
whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United





court should not look beyond its own law in determining a jurisdic-
tional issue. Nonetheless, Judge Hand recognized the court's duty
to construe the broad language of the Sherman Act in a manner
consistent with the limitations of international law.92
In summary, Judge Hand recognized that although Congress
has the constitutional power to enact laws contrary to interna-
tional law, he correctly stressed that a court is bound to read gen-
eral words capable of extremely broad and overreaching interpreta-
tion as consistent with international law.9 3
With regard to foreign activity having consequences in the
United States, however, Judge Hand recognized that the exercise
of United States jurisdiction is proper and consistent with both the
S.S. Lotus decision and the objective territorial principle of inter-
national law, asserting that: "[I]t is settled law . . . that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize."9 "
At this stage of the opinion, the court cites Strassheim v.
Daily"5 to support the notion that the objective territorial principle
is the proper basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. In that case, Jus-
tice Holmes asserted that: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it,
justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been
present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him
within its power. '"96
By citing the Supreme Court decision in which Justice Holmes
recognized the objective territorial principle, Judge Hand clearly
adopted this principle as the basis for invoking jurisdiction in
Alcoa.
Using two hypothetical situations, Judge Hand examined "in-
tent" and "effects." First, he postulated that there may be agree-
ments made abroad, not intended to affect U.S. imports or exports,




95. 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 148 F2d at 443.
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Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for ex-
ample, or in South America, ... may have repercussions in the
United States if there is trade between the two. Yet when one
considers the international complications likely to arise from an
effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is
safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to
cover them.98
In the second hypothetical, Judge Hand examined agreements
intended to include imports into the United States but which ap-
pear to have no effect upon such imports.99 The Judge noted that
this situation might fall within one of two doctrines. The first doc-
trine is that intent may be a substitute for performance in the case
of a contract made in the United States; thus proof of effects is not
a prerequisite to invoke jurisdiction. 00 On the other hand, the sec-
ond doctrine supports the principle that a statute should not be
interpreted to cover acts abroad which have no consequence in the
United States; thus proof of effects is necessary to assume jurisdic-
tion.10' Judge Hand refused to choose between these alternatives.
Instead, Judge Hand, citing such decisions as Pacific & Arctic,
Thomsen, and Sisal Sales, concluded that jurisdiction only exists
over activities abroad if the actions are both intended and actually
affect the commerce of the United States.
102
Judge Hand recognized that the liable parties in the cases he
cited had sent agents into United States territory to perform part
of the illegal agreement. He noted, however, that "an agent is
merely an animate means of executing his principal's purposes,
and, for the purposes of this case, he does not differ from an inani-
mate means; besides, only human agents can import and sell in-
got." 103 Accordingly, where both conditions of "intent" and "ef-
fect" are satisfied, the exercise of jurisdiction is proper.
After announcing the prerequisites to properly exercise juris-
diction, the Alcoa court found the requisite intent on the part of
the members of the international cartel in their 1936 agreement,
expressly made to accomplish an effect upon imports into the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 444.
101. Id.





With regard to proof of "effects," Judge Hand held that the
burden of proof shifted to the defendant, Limited, after the intent
to affect imports was proved.10 5 The rationale for this shift of the
normal burden was as follows:
The [district court] judge also found that the 1936 agreement
did not "materially affect the . . . foreign trade or commerce of
the United States"; apparently because the imported ingot was
greater in 1936 and 1937 than in earlier years. We cannot accept
this finding, based as it was upon the fact that, in 1936, 1937
and the first quarter of 1938, the gross imports of ingot in-
creased. It by no means follows from such an increase that the
agreement did not restrict imports; and incidentally it so hap-
pens that in those years such inference as is possible at all, leads
to the opposite conclusion. 10 6
The Alcoa court made findings that average imports of ingot
increased from about fifteen million pounds during the period from
1932-1935, and that during 1936, 1937, and the first quarter of
1938, the average imports were approximately thirty-three million
pounds; but that the average domestic manufacture of ingot in the
1932-1935 period was about ninety-six million pounds, and about
262 million in the latter period. Thus, the proportion of imports of
ingot to domestically manufactured ingot was about 15.6 percent
for the first period and about 12.6 percent for the second period.10 7
From all of this information, Judge Hand stated:
We do not mean to infer from this that the quota system of 1936
did in fact restrain imports, as these figures might suggest; but
we do mean that nothing is to be inferred from the gross in-
crease of imports. We shall dispose of the matter therefore upon
the assumption that, although the shareholders intended to re-
strict imports, it does not appear whether in fact they did so.
Upon our hypothesis the plaintiff would therefore fail, if it car-
ried the burden of proof upon this issue as upon others. 108
Accordingly, Judge Hand saw fit to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant once the plaintiff proves an intent to affect
104. Id.
105. Id. at 444.
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imports."°9
The only remaining question involving Limited was whether
the assumed restriction on imports had an influence upon prices. 110
Judge Hand responded that the Socony- Vacuum"' case answered
the question in the affirmative, and stated that:
It will be remembered that when the defendants in that case
protested that the prosecution had not proved that the "dis-
tress" gasoline had affected prices, the court answered that was
not necessary, because an agreement to withdraw any substan-
tial part of the supply from a market would, if carried out, have
some effect on prices, and was as unlawful as an agreement ex-
pressly to fix prices. The underlying doctrine was that all factors
which contribute to determine prices, must be kept free to oper-
ate unhampered by agreements. For these reasons we think that
the agreement of 1936 violated § 1 of the Act.1
12
B. The "Substantive Anticompetitive Effect" Requirement
Because Judge Hand's effects test is susceptible of several pos-
sible interpretations, the question of what effect is required has
been particularly troublesome. Courts and commentators disagree
as to whether an intent to restrain the commerce of the United
States will support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act without proof of an actual anticompetitive effect on such com-
merce." 3 It is proposed here that actual proof of a "substantive
anticompetitive effect" caused by foreign actors abroad must be
shown for the proper exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. In other words, the "effects" prong of Judge Hand's
jurisdictional test is met only when the effect of foreign actions
abroad upon the United States market violates the law, meaning
that a constituent element of the offense charged must occur in the
United States. Read in this way, Judge Hand's test is consistent
with the objective territorial principle of international law.""
109. Id. The court felt that this was the proper approach because the defendants had a
greater accessibility to the facts of the activities abroad that gave rise to the cause of action.
110. Id. at 445.
111. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
112. 148 F.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
113. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
114. The use of Chapter Eight of a draft copy of Professor Alan C. Swan's recently
published textbook, ALAN C. SWAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONoMic RELATIONS (1991), and numerous discussions with him must
be acknowledged for providing the inspiration for dealing with this subject matter, and
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Another view, however, is that Judge Hand's test was meant
to exclude unintended or de minimis foreign restraints on United
States commerce."1 ' Under this view, once the requisite intent is
shown, then the restraint must either occur "in the course" of in-
terstate or foreign commerce. If the restraint is not "in the course"
of such commerce, then it must "substantially affect" such com-
merce. 116 It must be noted here that the showing of a sufficient
effect differs in domestic interstate commerce cases and those in-
volving foreign commerce.
Recall, the Sherman Act applies to restraints of trade or com-
merce among the several states, or with foreign nations. Restraints
"in commerce" require no showing of an "effect" on interstate
commerce. When "intrastate" commerce is involved, however, a
sufficient "effect" on interstate commerce must be shown to invoke
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.1 7 With regard to domestic
cases involving alleged illegal activity not "in the stream" of inter-
state commerce, courts have generally held that the sufficient ef-
fect must be "not insubstantial" nor de minimis.11 8
The problem with the "mechanical" approach to jurisdiction is
that it inappropriately transposes the "interstate" jurisdictional
test to the "foreign commerce" setting. The test is satisfied if an
allegedly illegal restraint occurs before or after the foreign com-
merce phase, where the restraint was obviously "in commerce." Al-
ternatively, if the restraint is tangent to such commerce, then the
effects are deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction so long as the
amount of commerce affected is not de minimis.11 9 By this latter
theorem, commentators argue that the "mechanical" view borrows
the effects requirement from the domestic setting, where the activ-
ity is not "in the course" of interstate commerce, and applies it to
situations involving activities that are not "in the course" of for-
noted as a source of a number of the ideas behind the arguments made in this Comment.
115. 1 WnLnUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 71 (3d ed.
1982).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., McLean v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
118. McLean v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 44 U.S. 232, 246 (1980); Fortner
Enterprises, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969); Rosebrough Monu-
ment Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Assoc., 666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981).
119. See James A. Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What Is Cov-
ered? 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 6-9 (1974); James A. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of
the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRusT L.J. 521-25 (1974).
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eign commerce."'
Dean Rahl commented on the "mechanical" view, asserting
that:
I do not believe that the effect must be "adverse" in the sense
that the volume of commerce must be reduced. It is the effect on
competition, not on commerce, which must be adverse. What is
required, I believe, is that commerce in some way be distorted
from the path it would take if competition were not illegally in-
terfered with. Judge Wyzanski made this point in Minnesota
Mining when he said, "Congress has not said you may choke
commerce here if you nourish it there." It was made again re-
cently in the Occidental Petroleum decision, where the District
Court said that "when control of an item in commerce is wrested
from one competitor by another, the commerce of the article is
to that extent 'affected.'" I would have to say, based on inter-
state commerce cases, that even if the volume of U.S. commerce
were increased, . . . this would be a sufficient effect for jurisdic-
tional purposes.121
Thus, the effects test would be met, under this view, if a for-
eign restraint has some-not insubstantial-repercussion on for-
eign commerce. The connection between the restraint and some
commerce determines jurisdiction, but no specific quantum of
commerce is determinative as long as the volume or amount is not
de minimis. Likewise, where the restraint is found to apply to
goods, services, money, or technology that are "in commerce," ju-
risdiction is established without more.
Few would argue that this construction of the "mechanical"
view is consistent with the objective territorial principle of interna-
tional law. The following scholarly criticism of Judge Hand's ef-
fects test illustrates this inconsistency,122  via query and
observation:
120. Dean Rahl has rejected the mechanical approach and stated that:
There is great confusion over whether the restraint must in some way ad-
versely affect the commerce involved. The common, if not prevalent, impression
is that it must-that the volume must be diminished, or the flow distorted. But
this popular view, however widely held, does not, in my view, withstand analysis.
It is obviously inapposite as to restraints occurring "in" commerce, where no
effect at all need be shown ... Even where effect is necessary to support sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, the effect need not be adverse, although it usually is.
Rahl, American Antitrust, supra note 119, at 7 (emphasis in original).
121. Rahl, Foreign Commerce, supra note 119, at 524-25 (footnotes omitted).




Assuming there are no governing treaty commitments and no
governmental agreements with private parties involved, could
this country [the United States] pass today and legitimately en-
force, on the basis of the "effects" doctrine, a law stating that it
was a criminal offense for foreign coffee growers to ship less cof-
fee to the United States this year than they shipped last year?
Or could we legitimately make it an offense for any foreign cus-
tomer abroad to buy less cotton from us in the coming year than
he had bought last year? In such cases there would clearly be an
effect on foreign commerce of the United States, should the cof-
fee-growers reduce their shipments to the United States or the
foreign importers reduce their purchases of cotton from us, and
this effect would be a constituent part of the offense under the
[Sherman Act] . .. .s
The above critique correctly notes that, under these circum-
stances, jurisdiction should not be founded on the effects doctrine.
If merely effects, such as those illustrated in this example, invoked
jurisdiction, an exercise of jurisdiction would be inconsistent with
international law. Raymond assumes that Judge Hand's formula-
tion of the effects doctrine would justify a jurisdictional exercise
given this hypothetical situation. It clearly does not. The "substan-
tive anticompetitive effects" approach would put any of these con-
cerns regarding overreaching jurisdictional claims to rest. In this
regard, another author has stated:
If a State can take jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by
foreigners because they have "consequences" within its territory
and it "reprehends" such acts, the door is open to an almost
unlimited extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction. That foreign
nationals are answerable for their acts within the territory of the
United States is beyond question, but to prosecute them for
what they do abroad can be justified only if an objective applica-
tion to the territorial principle is permissible. . . . Unless "con-
sequences" and "harmful effects" mean "constituent element of
the crime," which might permit an objective application, [Alcoa
and other cases] are contrary to international law.
124
123. Id. at 562-63.
124. Haight, supra note 38, at 643. Unfortunately, Haight's observations are only good
up to this point. He goes on to argue that a Sherman Act offense is not one which the
community of nations recognizes as justifying a modification of a strict territorial principle.
He maintains that Sherman Act prosecutions cannot be justified because an objective appli-
cation of the territorial principle is not permissible in such antitrust situations. This is sim-
ply not true if one follows Judge Hand's effects test which specifically incorporates the ob-
jective territorial principle. The position maintained in this discussion is that while
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Another noted author has expressed his concern that the ef-
fects doctrine may lead to slippery slope jurisprudence and result
in jurisdictional overreaching."'5
These examples and comments reflect a legitimate concern
that the effects doctrine under the Alcoa decision is inconsistent
with the principles of international law. This concern may be well
founded with respect to the mechanical approach, where the Sher-
man Act inappropriately becomes a form of a commercial tort law.
For instance, under that approach, a specific injury to a particular
individual firm may suffice to support jurisdiction rather than a
showing of an anticompetitive effect on the United States market.
Under the "substantive anticompetitive" test, however, the Sher-
man Act meets the requirements of international law under the ob-
jective territorial principle by requiring proof of an actual anticom-
petitive effect in the United States, caused by foreign actors
abroad. Accordingly, a showing that a constituent element of the
offense charged occurred in the United States gives rise to the
proper exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
Moreover, the mere fact that a restraint is "in commerce" will not,
by itself, meet the international law standard. As suggested by
Chief Justice Marshall,12 6 statutes should never be construed as
contravening international law if a consistent construction is at all
possible. In the foreign commerce setting, the words "in com-
merce" must be subsumed within the "affects" commerce require-
international law does not clearly define the limits of effects jurisdiction, it does seem to
reject a strict territorial principle in circumstances including antitrust cases as evidenced by
state practice.
125. Professor Jennings expressed this fear in stating:
[The objective territorial principle] is often said to apply where the offence
"takes effect" or "produces its effects" in the territory. In relation to elementary
cases of direct physical injury, such as homicide, this is unexceptionable, for here
the "effect" which is meant is an essential ingredient of the crime. Once we move
out of the sphere of direct physical consequences, however, to employ the
formula of "effects" is to enter upon a very slippery slope; for here the effects
within the territory may be no more than an element of alleged consequential
damage which may be more or less remote. ... [T]o extend the notion of ef-
fects, without qualification, from the simple cases of direct physical injury to
cases such as defamation, sedition, and the like, is to introduce a dangerous am-
biguity into the basis of the doctrine. If indeed it were permissible to found
objective territorial jurisdiction upon the territoriality of more or less remote
repercussions of an act wholly performed in another territory, then there were
virtually no limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction.
Jennings, supra note 41, at 159.
126. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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ment.'2  Otherwise, as with the mechanical approach, the United
States would enter upon the "slippery slope" of improper exten-
sions of jurisdictional claims over foreign conduct, which Jennings
was concerned about.12 Even Judge Hand in Alcoa did not want to
impute to Congress "an intent to punish all whom U.S. courts
could catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States.
12 9
In order to illustrate that the a "substantive anticompetitive
effect" is required under Judge Hand's effects test, a closer look at
the opinion is necessary.
As noted in the prior discussion of Alcoa, the foreign cartel,
referred to as the Alliance, made sales of aluminum -ingot which
were imported into the United States market. Ingot sales had in-
creased in absolute terms from about fifteen million pounds during
the years of 1932 to 1935, to about thirty-three million pounds be-
tween 1936 and the first quarter of 1938.130 The Alliance's sales to
the United States had declined, however, as a percentage of the
total U.S. market, from about 15.6 percent for the first period to
about 12.6 percent for the second, due to increases in the domestic
manufacture of ingot. 131
127. See REP. Avr'y GEN. NAT. CoMMirEE TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (1955). This
report described the effect necessary for the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. The following description is consistent with the substantive anticompetitive
approach suggested above:
We feel that the Sherman Act applies only to those arrangements between
Americans alone, or in concert with foreign firms, which have such substantial
anticompetitive effects on this country's "trade or commerce ...with foreign
nations' as to constitute unreasonable restraints.
We believe that conspiracies between foreign competitors alone should come
within the Sherman Act only where they are intended to, and actually do, result
in substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign commerce. The "interna-
tional complications likely to arise" from any contrary view convince us, as they
did the Court in Alcoa "that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover"
such arrangements when they have no restrictive purpose and effect on our
commerce.
Id. at 76 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949)). With re-
gard to what the committee intended as the meaning of substantial anticompetitive effects,
one committee member submitted his view as follows: "'Substantial anticompetitive ef-
fects'" referred to here and elsewhere in the Report mean of course 'anticompetitive effects'
which are direct as well as substantial." Id. at 76, note 61.
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
129. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
130. Id. at 444.
131. Id. The manufacturing levels of domestic ingot grew from 96 million pounds to 262
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According to Judge Hand, neither the gross increase in im-
ports of ingot nor the decrease in the proportion of imports to the
production of domestic ingot was sufficient to establish whether
the cartel's activities produced the requisite "effect" on United
States commerce to invoke jurisdiction. Thus, the proof that the
cartel's imports constituted between twelve percent and fifteen
percent of the U.S. market did not establish the "effect" required
for jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
Plainly, if proof of imports amounting to twelve to fifteen per-
cent of the total United States market for aluminum ingot did not
establish the "effect" required for Sherman Act jurisdiction, Judge
Hand can be understood to require something more than a mere
restraint "in commerce" or non-de minimis effect. Moreover, there
must be more than Rahl's mechanical view'3 2 would require. What
then, is required? Hand's opinion supplies the answer.
Judge Hand characterizes the Alliance as a "depressant upon
production."I"3 Prior to the formation of the Alliance, each of its
members was a potential entrant into the market. As such, each
member had the ability to affect the pricing behavior of Alcoa as a
domestic monopolist in the United States. Judge Hand explicitly
makes this point when addressing Alcoa's domestic monopoly.13'
Having found that Alcoa at times had controlled up to ninety per-
cent of the domestic ingot market with the remainder consisting of
imports, Judge Hand concluded that such control is undoubtedly a
monopoly."3 5 The evidence involving the manufacturing capacity of
the Alliance suggests that "there may well have been a practically
unlimited supply of imports as the price of ingot rose."'3 6 The
court stressed that the Alliance's possession of such a supply ena-
bled it to be a potential entrant into the American market and
served to put a ceiling on the prices that the domestic monopolist,
Alcoa, could charge for ingot. 3'
million pounds for the same time period.
132. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
133. 148 F.2d at 444.
134. Id. at 426.
135. Id. at 425.
136. Id. at 426.
137. Judge Hand made this point, likening the situation to that of a classic oligopoly:
Assuming that there was no agreement between "Alcoa" and foreign producers
not to import, [the foreign producers] sold what could bear the handicap of the
tariff [imposed by the United States] and the cost of transportation... . While
the record is silent, we may therefore assume ... that, had "Alcoa" raised its
prices, more ingot would have been imported. Thus, [for foreign producers,]. ..
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In describing the Alliance as a "depressant upon produc-
tion,"1 s8 Judge Hand meant that by increasing the level of concen-
tration in the U.S. market, the cartel members enhanced the po-
tential for that curtailment of production which is the hallmark of
tacit oligopolistic collusion. The resulting "substantive anticompe-
titive economic effect" established a rebuttable presumption of ju-
risdiction, and is the "effect" Judge Hand was speaking of. Thus,
the burden of proof had been shifted to the defendant to prove
that the Alliance did not have this anticompetitive effect on cur-
tailing imports.'39 If the defendants met this burden, jurisdiction
would be defeated.
Judge Hand is even more explicit. The defendants, he ex-
plained, must prove that their anticompetitive motive in establish-
ing a cartel was "over-balanced in all instances by motives which
induced the shareholders to import .... ,,14 The cartel members
needed to show that the U.S. market became "so attractive" that
the economic incentives of competing on an individual basis would
lead to the abandonment of their restrictive arrangement.1 4 1 If car-
tel members operated per the agreement and received the royalties
which the agreement awarded, then it would be less attractive for
them to adhere to the agreement's restrictions than to compete in
the American market on an individual basis. The court noted that
the defendants must show that "the royalties [from the arrange-
ment] did not count at all and their expectations were in fact de-
feated.''4 2 In other words, proof is required that the cartel miscal-
culated in deciding that it possessed sufficient market power for
the successful imposition of a supra-competitive price, given the
oligopolist structure of the market. Where there is no power to ex-
act a supra-competitive price, there can be no "effect" on the
United States market.
To illustrate further, suppose that instead of a cartel, the for-
a rise in price will presumably induce [them] immediately to divert to the Amer-
ican market what they have been selling elsewhere. It is entirely consistent with
the evidence that it was the threat of greater foreign imports which kept "Al-
coa's" prices where they were, and prevented it from exploiting its advantage as
sole domestic producer; indeed, it is hard to resist the conclusion that potential
imports did put a "ceiling" upon those prices.
148 F.2d at 426.
138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139. 148 F.2d at 444.
140. 148 F.2d at 444-45.
141. Id. at 445.
142. Id.
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eign producers had merged their operations into a single holding
company. Today, under these circumstances, the formation of the
Alliance would be treated as a merger under the 1984 Merger
Guidelines. 143 These Guidelines provide various thresholds of in-
dustry concentration that are thought to identify the potential ex-
istence of collusive pricing in concentrated oligopolistic markets.
The Guidelines incorporate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) as an indicator to determine the existence of, and any sig-
nificant increases in market concentration. 144 The HHI evaluates
market concentration based on the relative size and distribution of
the firms in a particular market. Using the HHI as a tool, the Alli-
ance's potential "effect" on the competitiveness of the U.S. market
can be evaluated.
Hypothetically, if Alcoa had enjoyed an eighty-five percent
share of the United States market before the formation of the Alli-
ance, and five individual foreign ingot producers had three percent
each, the industry's concentration under the HHI would be 7,270.
If the formation of the Alliance was treated as a merger of the for-
eign producers, however, the industry HHI would have risen to
7,450, an increase in concentration of 180 points. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Department of Justice would challenge this
merger due to the extremely high post-merger concentration of the
market. Moreover, the 180 point increase in concentration caused
by the merger would signal an unacceptably dangerous potential
for supra-competitive pricing.
14 5
Compare another situation. Suppose, that instead of Alcoa
holding eighty-five percent of the United States market, the U.S.
industry consisted of six or seven independent and competitive
U.S. firms of roughly the same size. Consider further that the five
foreign firms in the Alliance each had a three percent market
share. The HHI market concentration in this situation would be
about 1,178 before the Alliance was established and would increase
143. See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
13,103, at 20,559-64 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
144. For a more complete discussion of exactly what the HHI is and how the Depart-
ment uses it in market concentration determinations, as well as other Department of Justice
inquiries into mergers under these Merger Guidelines, see infra notes 161-65 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,560-61 indicating that the Depart-
ment of Justice will tend to challenge mergers with a post-merger HHI above 1,800 and an
increase in the HHI of more than 100 points. The Department has adopted this position
because mergers in such range are regarded as extremely likely to lessen competition even if
other economic factors considered by the Department may suggest otherwise.
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only eighty points to 1,258 after the cartel's formation. The De-
partment of Justice asserts in its Guidelines that it is unlikely to
challenge mergers of firms in industries with this level of concen-
tration when the post-merger increase in concentration is less than
100 points, because such mergers are not likely to substantially
lessen competition."
Under these hypothetical circumstances, Judge Hand would
probably find no that jurisdiction exists using his "effects" test.
This Alliance is a significantly weaker "depressant on production"
and lacks sufficient power to threaten the U.S. market with a
supra-competitive price. Accordingly, this arrangement would have
no anticompetitive "effect."
Because the Alliance's royalty system was established to con-
trol supply and hence price, it is a classic example of a price-fixing
device, which is proscribed as a per se offense under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 1 7 In general, a per se analysis is used to deter-
mine the lawfulness of trade restraints that are viewed as inher-
ently anticompetitive; thus, no inquiry is made into any procompe-
titive benefits that the restraints may yield.1 8 With some
variations, the per se rule essentially establishes one or more con-
clusive presumptions regarding the harm created by collusive pric-
ing, where normally the harms require affirmative proof.
14 9
The first conclusive presumption of the per se rule is that the
parties have market power, the ability to affect market price. This
presumption rests on the presuppositions that the purpose of an
agreement is to raise prices to supra-competitive levels and that
careful business persons will not engage in such a price-fixing ar-
rangement, unless reasonably assured that they possess the market
power necessary for success.
The second presumption is that the price charged is a supra-
competitive price. If the conspirators had power over price, then
no competitive price can be shown with which to establish a viola-
tion. Proving that a supra-competitive price was charged would be
146. Id.; Merger Guidelines, see infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 (1940).
148. Id. at 218. As it was stated in the Socony- Vacuum case, the "[Supreme] Court has
consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses
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very difficult. Even if the price charged as a result of an agreement
is competitive, the presumption of power over price remains. This
is true because it is reasonable to presuppose that the restrictive
agreement was not an idle exercise and that participants intended,
sooner or later, to raise prices above a competitive level. Otherwise,
the arrangement would require continuous policing which is practi-
cally beyond judicial and executive means.
Judge Hand's "effects" test modifies this per se rule by trans-
forming the conclusive presumption of market power to only a re-
buttable presumption. As a consequence, the defendant, now hav-
ing the burden of proof, can show that the cartel arrangement did
not in fact have the requisite market power to exact a supra-com-
petitive price from the U.S. market; thus, meeting his burden of
proof. It will not be conclusively presumed that foreign parties
have market power in the relevant United States market.
Although Judge Hand's "substantive anticompetitive effects"
jurisdictional test permits a defense based on the absence of power
to fix prices, it does not require actual proof that the cartel
charged a supra-competitive price. Such proof is unnecessary be-
cause the per se rule's presumption of power is distinguishable
from the presumption regarding price. Thus, discussing Socony-
Vacuum, Judge Hand observed that:
It will be remembered that, when the defendants in that case
protested that the prosecution had not proved that the "dis-
tress" gasoline had affected prices, the court answered that that
was not necessary, because an agreement to withdraw any sub-
stantial part of the supply from a market would, if carried out,
have some effect on prices, and was as unlawful as an agreement
expressly to fix prices. The underlying doctrine was that all fac-
tors which contribute to determine prices, must be kept free to
operate unhampered by agreements. For these reasons we think
that the agreement of 1936 violated § 1 of the Act. 50
This modified per se rule regarding foreign price-fixing cartels
is particularly appropriate when examined from a broader interna-
tional policy perspective. Many governments favor policies which
protect particular industries from unfair competition or volatile
markets. Some governments may view closely regulated cartels as
assisting new markets entrants or assisting established and infant
industries to achieve economies of scale and other efficiencies. De-
150. 148 F.2d 416, 445 (2d Cir. 1945).
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veloping countries may permit the use of a cartel as a means of
redistributing wealth or promoting other policies.
The United States has for a long time exempted particular in-
dustries from the discipline of a competitive market to promote
similar governmental objectives. Since Congress has made such ex-
emptions for certain portions of the economy, United States courts
should be sensitive to the similar policy considerations that may
underlie the existence of foreign cartels, for instance. These policy
considerations need not be similar to U.S. policies. The United
States should not attempt to export its peculiarly economic or po-
litical notions into other sovereign states which may have their
own legitimate policy concerns.151
If adherence to these considerations and assumptions is appro-
priate in a domestic case, they should also be accorded equal
weight when a case has international ramifications. Therefore, a
flexible approach which requires the showing of actual proof of a
foreign defendant's power to impose monopolistic evils upon the
United States would seem to be essential and consistent with the
objective territorial principle of international law, at least in terms
of the larger foreign economic policy interests of the United States.
Inherent in the problem of determining whether the requisite
"effects" exist to properly exercise jurisdiction in international an-
titrust cases is the procedural notion that the jurisdictional test
wrongfully involves inquiries into the substantive merits of a case.
Critics who would argue that Judge Hand's test inappropriately
passes on the merits of the case fail to distinguish between pre-
scriptive jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
The issue of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists goes
simply to the constitutional or statutory competence of a particu-
lar court to hear a case. It does not reach the merits of a dispute,
which involves one's substantive legal rights without regard to a
court's competence to adjudicate the matter. Prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, however, goes to the question of whether the sovereign,
151. Haight, supra, note 38 at 650. Haight has articulated this point well in stating
that:
In any country, trade regulation or lack of it is determined by the judgment of
that country as to what is best in its own public interest. Nations necessarily
differ according to race, geography, climate, raw materials, and social and eco-
nomic development. In many instances a highly competitive economy is consid-
ered wholly unsuitable, and combinations are regarded as essential.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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United States, has conferred a cause of action on the plaintiff. A
motion challenging prescriptive jurisdiction asserts that the plain-
tiff has failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."' 152 Occasionally a challenge to the merits of the plaintiff's
claim or a challenge to the court's authority depends on common
questions of fact. The subject matter of the plaintiff's case may
also bear upon the court's authority over that case. Such similari-
ties, however, should not be allowed to conceal the fundamental
distinction between prescriptive and subject matter jurisdiction.
The American Banana153 and Sisal Sales'" cases reached the
Supreme Court after the lower court had dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaints for failure to state a cause of action. In the Alcoa case,
Judge Hand posed the jurisdictional question as whether the 1931
agreement or 1936 agreement violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 55 In framing the issue in this manner, Judge Hand necessarily
focused specifically on whether Congress intended to impose liabil-
ity upon the foreign actor's conduct. This is not the language re-
garding a "subject matter" jurisdiction inquiry. Instead, this is the
language of a prescriptive jurisdiction inquiry and goes to the
question of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.
VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES
In summary, Judge Hand's "effects" test requires the showing
of a "substantive anticompetitive effect" for the proper exercise of
Sherman Act jurisdiction. This suggests the need for a more disci-
plined approach to determine if sufficient effects exist to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case. The United States Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines15 6 may provide the needed discipline.
These Guidelines establish an economic inquiry to determine the
extent of market concentration and post-merger increases in mar-
ket concentration, in order to identify potentially anticompetitive
mergers. In addition, the Guidelines specify various thresholds of
concentration to be used as criteria for further inquiry into an in-
dustry's potential for supra-competitive pricing. The Guidelines
also identify other economic factors which help assess when an ap-
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
153. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
155. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
156. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143.
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parently collusive arrangement has a probability of success so that
market power could be created, enhanced, or its exercise facilitated
in violation of the Sherman Act.
The. DOJ's Guidelines should be applied as a vehicle to indi-
cate whether sufficient "substantive anticompetitive effects" on
U.S. commerce exist to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over for-
eigners' activities abroad that violate the Sherman Act. Obviously,
a "substantive anticompetitive effects" test requires significant ec-
onomic inquiry. The Guidelines provide a sound basis for that in-
quiry and may be utilized for purposes beyond mergers. Utilizing
the Guidelines in making the "effects" determination for conduct
allegedly occurring outside the territorial limits of the United
States or involving foreign defendants (including foreign cartels),
would be valuable to alert courts that a significant element of the
requisite "substantial anticompetitive effects" test for jurisdiction
has been established. If foreign actors abroad cross the Guideline's
concentration thresholds and an examination of the other eco-
nomic factors indicates possible anticompetitive pricing, then a
"substantial anticompetitive effect" may exists in the United
States, justifying the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if the concentration threshold is not crossed, or an ex-
amination of the other economic factors suggests that there is no
genuine risk of anticompetitive pricing, then it may be concluded
that under a "substantive anticompetitive effects" approach, the
restraint on U.S. commerce is insufficient to warrant an exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
It must be noted that the "international application" of these
Guidelines is limited to the purpose stated: to serve merely one
vehicle to determine whether jurisdiction exists, not as the exclu-
sive determinant of such issue.
The Department of Justice issued its merger Guidelines in
1984 to outline its enforcement policy concerning acquisitions and
mergers subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The Guidelines describe general principles and
specific standards which the DOJ uses in analyzing such mergers.
The Department believes that it uses these standards in a reasona-
ble and flexible fashion in determining whether it will challenge a
given merger. The Guidelines do not indicate, however, the De-
partment's litigation position with respect to mergers already being
challenged.
The central theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should
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not be permitted for the purpose of creating, enhancing, or facili-
tating the exercise of "market power. ' 15 7 The DOJ identifies two
situations where market power may exist: Monopoly and oligop-
oly." ' In the monopolistic environment, market power essentially
exists when a monopolist, which is a sole seller of a product with
no good substitutes, can maintain a selling price, that is above the
level that would prevail if the given market were competitive. Al-
ternatively, such power exists where a sole buyer of a product has
the ability to depress the price paid to below the competitive price.
In the oligopolistic environment, where only a few firms account
for the sale or purchase of a given product. Market power may ex-
ist when these firms either implicitly or explicitly coordinate their
activities to achieve the selling or buying advantages enjoyed by
the single-firm monopolist. Accordingly, the DOJ broadly defines
the term "market power" as the "ability of one or more firms prof-
itably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time," to encompass and regulate both market condi-
tions.159 Although mergers may harm competition, they also have
an important role in a free enterprise economy. e0
The Department's Guidelines provide a flexible six-step ap-
proach to determine whether the DOJ will challenge a horizontal
merger of firms. Horizontal firms are in the same product and geo-
graphic markets."' In applying the six-step approach the Depart-
ment will examine the following: First, under section 3.11 of the
Guidelines, the post-merger concentration of the relevant market
(including both product and geographic markets) as characterized
157. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,555-56.
158. Id. at 20,555.
159. Id. at 20,555-56.
160. Id. Indeed, the DOJ notes that mergers:
.. . can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of in-
vestment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets. While chal-
lenging competitively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unneces-
sary interference with that larger universe of mergers that are either
competitively beneficial or neutral.
Id. at 20,556.
161. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,559-60. It should be noted that the De-
partment also analyzes non-horizontal mergers under section 4 of the Guidelines. Id. at
20,559-60. The DOJ states that non-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in
the same market and that "[it necessarily follows that such mergers produce no immediate
change in the level of concentration in any relevant market as defined in Section 2 of these
Guidelines. Although non-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to cre-
ate competitive problems, they are not invariably innocuous." Id. at 20,564.
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by the HHI;162 second, also under section 3.11, the increase in mar-
ket concentration due to the merger as measured by HHI;
1" third,
under section 3.2, a variety of factors affecting the significance of
market shares and concentrations;""' fourth, under section 3.3, the
ease of entry into the relevant market;165 fifth, under section 3.4, a
variety of other factors that affect the likelihood that a merger will
create, enhance, or facilitate supra-competitive pricing;
16e and
sixth, under section 3.5, any potential procompetitive efficiencies
that the merger is likely to create.
1 6 7
In a merger involving horizontal firms, the DOJ focuses on the
first two steps mentioned above; namely, the pre-merger concen-
tration of the market and the increase in concentration caused by
the merger. If a merger results in low market concentration or a
relatively slight increase in concentration, the DOJ will determine
that the merger poses no significant threat to competition without
further consideration of the last four steps. If the concentration is
not low, or more than a slight increase in concentration is evident,
however, the DOJ will proceed to examine the variety of other rel-
evant economic factors. "
The Department describes "market concentration" as follows:
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a
market and their respective market shares. Other things being
equal, concentration affects the likelihood that one firm, or
small group of firms, could successfully exercise market power.
The smaller the percentage of total supply that a firm controls,
the more severely it must restrict its own output in order to pro-
duce a given price increase, and the less likely it is that an out-
put restriction will be profitable. If collective action is necessary,
an additional constraint applies. As the number of firms neces-
sary to control a given percentage of total supply increases, the
difficulties and costs of reaching and enforcing consensus with
respect to the control of that supply also increase.
169
162. Id. at 20,560.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 20,561.
165. Id. at 20,562.
166. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,562.
167. Id. at 20,564.
168. Id. at 20,559-60.
169. Id. at 20,560. The Department notes that there is a spectrum of different types of
markets ranging from "atomistic, where a very large number of firms that are small relative
to the overall size of the market compete with one another, to monopolistic, where one firm
controls the entire market." Id. at 20,560 n. 13. The greatest analytical difficulty is posed in
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In the first step of its economic inquiry, the Department de-
termines market concentration and evaluates the merged firm's
pre-merger market power. This is accomplished by assigning it to
one of three regions of concentration which serve as the thresholds
for the determination of whether the merged firm possesses the
requisite market power to act anticompetitively. Step two of the
inquiry involves the evaluation of the increase in market concen-
tration resulting from the merger. The DOJ uses the HHI of mar-
ket concentration as an aid to interpret market data. 170 The HHI is
calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares
of all firms included in the market as defined in section 2.171 To
illustrate, the Guidelines cite the following example:
[A] market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30 per-
cent, 30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent has an HHI of 2600
(302 30' 20' 20' = 2600). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the
case of a pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the
case of an atomistic market). Although it is desirable to include
all firms in the calculation, lack of information about small




Once market concentration is determined, the DOJ divides the
concentration spectrum into three regions. The first is regarded as
unconcentrated with an HHI below 1,000, the second is character-
ized as moderately concentrated with an HHI between 1,000 and
1,800, and the third is highly concentrated with an HHI exceeding
the middle range, the most common type of market, where a small number of firms account
for the majority of the sales in a given market. Id.
170. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,552.
171. Id. at 20,559. Market shares are calculated and assigned in section 2.4 of the guide-
lines which provides in relevant part that:
The Department normally will include in the market the total sales or ca-
pacity of all domestic firms (or plants) that are identified as being in the market
under Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Market shares can be expressed either in dollar
terms through measurement of sales, shipments, or production, or in physical
terms through measurement of sales, shipments, production, capacity, or
reserves.
In some cases, however, total sales or capacity may overstate the competi-
tive significance of a firm. The Department will include only those sales likely to
be made or capacity to be used in the market in response to a "small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory" increase in price ....
Id. at 20,559.
172. Id. at 20,560 n.14.
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1,800.173 A DOJ study concerning size dispersion of firms within
markets found that the HHI thresholds of 1,000 and 1,800 corre-
spond roughly to four-firm concentration ratios of fifty percent and
seventy percent, respectively. 
17
With regard to the "unconcentrated" region, the DOJ will not,
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, challenge the
merger because: (1) implicit coordination among the firms in the
industry is likely to be difficult, and (2) the prohibitions of section
1 of the Sherman Act are considered an adequate response to any
explicit collusion that might occur.
1 75
On the other hand, "moderately concentrated" mergers with
HHI concentrations between 1,000 and 1,800 are likely to be chal-
lenged if the post-merger increase in concentration exceeds 100
points. 76 The DOJ, however, is unlikely to challenge a merger if it
concludes that the merger is not likely to substantially lessen com-
petition after examining the post-merger HHI, the increase in
HHI, and the presence or absence of the economic factors consti-
tuting the final four steps (sections 3.2-3.5) of the Department's
merger analysis. 7 7 Mergers causing HHI increases of less than 100
will ordinarily not be challenged unless circumstances require a
further inquiry.1
7 8
In the "highly concentrated" region with post-merger HHI
above 1,800, mergers will be challenged if an HHI increase of more
than fifty points occurs, unless the Department concludes, on the
basis of the same six steps mentioned in the second region, that
the merger is not likely to substantially lessen competition.'
79
Mergers causing an HHI increase of less than 50 points are un-
likely to be challenged. 80 In this region, however, if the increase in
HHI exceeds 100 and the post-merger HHI substantially exceeds
1,800, then only in extraordinary cases will the presence or absence
of the economic factors discussed in the final four steps of the
analysis establish that the merger is not likely to substantially
lessen competition.18'
173. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,560.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 20,560-61.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,560.
179. Id. at 20,561.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 20,560. The guidelines provide that increases in concentration are relevant
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The third step of the Merger Guidelines' inquiry involves ex-
amination of factors affecting the significance of market shares and
concentration. In many situations, market share and concentration
information from an HHI analysis "may either understate or over-
state the likely future competitive significance of a firm or firms in
the market." 182
The fourth step of the Guidelines, under section 3.3, concerns
the "ease of entry" into a market.183 If a firm may enter the market
so easily that existing competitors could not succeed in charging an
anticompetitive price for any significant period of time, then the
DOJ would probably not challenge mergers in that market. None-
theless, the Department would "consider the likelihood and proba-
ble magnitude of entry in response to a 'small but significant and
nontransitory' increase in price."'" The greater the difficulty of
entry into the relevant market is, the more likely the Department
is to challenge the merger.18 5
The fifth step of the DOJ's merger analysis involves the evalu-
ation of a variety of factors under section 3.4 which affect the like-
lihood that a merger will create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise
of market power.8 8 These factors will be considered in relation to
the ease and profitability of collusion.8 7 If these factors are rele-
vant to the issue of collusion, then they will be especially germane
when the DOJ's decision to challenge a merger is otherwise close.
Factors considered by the Department at this stage of its
merger analysis include: The nature of the product and terms of
to several key issues involving competitiveness:
Although mergers among small firms increase concentration, they are less likely
to have anticompetitive consequences. Moreover, even in concentrated markets,
it is desirable to allow firms some scope for merger activity in order to achieve
economies of scale and to permit exit from the market. However, market share
and concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the compet-
itive impact of merger. Before determining whether to challenge a merger, the
Department will consider all other relevant factors that pertain to its competi-
tive impact.
Id.
182. Id. at 20,561.
183. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,562.
184. Id. at 20,562 (footnote omitted). In "ease of entry" inquiries under section 3.3 of
the guidelines, the "nontransitory" increase in price period is two years rather than the one
year period used in the product market definition of section 2.1. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 20,562.
187. Id.
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sale, 18 information about specific transactions and buyer charac-
teristics, " the ability of small or fringe sellers to increase sales,
90
the conduct of firms in the market, 9' and the performance of
firms.1 92
188. Merger Guidelines, supra note 143, at 20,562-63. The Department notes that this
factor involves an inquiry into the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the relevant product.
Id. In a market with a homogeneous and undifferentiated product, a cartel generally must
only establish a single price. Id. In this situation, consensus among colluding firms is more
evident as is the detection of deviations from the explicit or tacit agreement. As the prod-
ucts constituting the relevant product market become more numerous, heterogeneous, or
differentiated, it becomes increasingly difficult for a cartel to enforce a complex scheme,
involving more than the mere imposition of a single price. Id. Thus, the DOJ is more likely
to challenge a merger when the relevant product market is completely homogeneous and
undifferentiated. Conversely, the Department will not challenge a merger involving hetero-
geneous products. Id. The Department also considers the degree of difference between the
products and locations in the market and the next-best substitutes. Id. The concern here is,
first, whether the next-best substitute product is only slightly or significantly inferior to the
last product included in the relevant product market; or, second, whether the next-most-
distant seller is only slightly or significantly farther away than the last seller included in the
geographic market. Id. at 20,563. The larger the "gap" at the edge of the product and geo-
graphic market, the more likely the DOJ will challenge the merger. Id. Additionally, the
Department may look at the similarity and difference in the products and locations of the
merging firms. Id. Under this inquiry, the DOJ is likely to challenge mergers where the
products or plants of the merging firms are particularly good substitutes for one another. Id.
189. Id. at 20,563. With regard to information about specific transactions, the Depart-
ment notes that collusive agreements are more likely to persist if the participating firms can
easily detect and retaliate against deviations from the terms of the agreement. Id. When
detailed information about specific transactions or individual price or output levels is availa-
ble to competitors (with sources including exchanges among sellers, public disclosure by
buyers, reports by the press or a government agency), deviations are easier to detect and less
likely to occur. Id. Thus, the Department is more likely to challenge mergers when such
information is available and suggests collusion. Id.
190. Id. at 20,563. With regard to a small firm's ability to increase sales, the DOJ as-
serts that:
Collusion is less likely to occur if small or fringe sellers in the market are able
profitably to increase output substantially in response to a "small but significant
and nontransitory" increase in price and thus to undermine a cartel. The De-
partment is less likely to challenge a merger if small or fringe firms currently are
able to expand significantly their sales at incremental costs that are approxi-
mately equal to their incremental costs experienced at current levels of output.
Id.
191. Id. The Department states that it would probably challenge a merger involving
firms with any of one of the following characteristics: (1) a history of previous engagement
in collusive practices; (2) a number of specific (enumerated) practices which suggest that an
agreement exists in certain circumstances; (3) the acquired firm was an unusually disruptive
and competitive influence in the market. Id.
192. Merger Guidelines, supra note 14, at 20,563-64. The Department notes that a
merger made in a noncompetitive market environment will more likely be challenged. In
this regard, the guidelines state: "Noncompetitive performance suggests that the firms in
the market already have succeeded in overcoming, at least to some extent, the obstacles to
effective collusion. Increased concentration of such a market through merger could further
facilitate the collusion that already exists." Id. In its evaluation of the performance of a
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW: EFFECTS TEST
The last step of the DOJ's merger analysis involves the consid-
eration of any pro-competitive efficiencies that the merger may
create. 93 With respect to efficiencies, the Merger Guidelines state
that:
The primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their effi-
ciency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competitive-
ness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers. Because
the antitrust laws, and thus the standards of the Guidelines, are
designed to proscribe only mergers that present a significant
danger to competition, they do not present an obstacle to most
mergers. As a consequence, in the majority of cases, the Guide-
lines will allow firms to achieve available efficiencies through
mergers without interference from the Department.
Some mergers that the Department otherwise might chal-
lenge may be reasonably necessary to achieve significant net effi-
ciencies. If the parties to the merger establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that a merger will achieve such efficiencies, the
Department will consider those efficiencies in deciding whether
to challenge the merger.1
9 4
If United States courts choose to employ the Merger Guide-
lines' standards in prescriptive jurisdictional inquiries concerning
the issue of whether sufficient "effects" exist to apply the Sherman
Act to foreign conduct, they will conform to the requirements of
the Alcoa test and international law. In view of the rapidly chang-
ing world and its accompanying complex commercial international
relationships, the adoption of the Guidelines is necessary.
VII. POST-ALCOA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS
It is important to reiterate that, except in the rare case where
nationality or protective principles might be applicable, the use of
the Sherman Act to cover foreign conduct is permissible under in-
market, the DOJ will give particular weight to the following evidence of possible noncom-
petitive performance when the factors are found together: "(a) Stable relative market shares
of the leading firms in recent years; (b) Declining combined market share of the leading
firms in recent years; and (c) profitability of the leading firms over substantial periods of
time that significantly exceeds that of firms in industries comparable in capital intensity
and risk." Id.
193. Id. at 20,564. The Guidelines identify the following as some of the cognizable effi-
ciencies that may be enhanced as a result of a merger: "Achieving economies of scale, better
integration of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and sim-
ilar efficiencies . . . ." Id.
194. Id. at 20,564.
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ternational law only if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with
the objective territorial principle. This study has demonstrated
that Judge Hand's "effects" test is a valid basis for the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction when the Alcoa opinion is read to require
a "substantive anticompetitive effect." While proliferating a vari-
ety of semantical deviations from the Alcoa test, 195 United States
courts have failed to adhere to this requirement, in turn, causing
the Sherman Act to take on the overbroad character of extended
commercial tort law.
Many foreign governments and commentators have severely
criticized the Alcoa decision as being violative of international law,
in large part, due to an improper reading of a mechanical effects
test into the decision. 196 Furthermore, many courts simply have
not applied or interpreted the effects test in a manner which is
consistent with international law's principle of objective territorial-
ity. One notable exception is the National Bank of Canada v. In-
terbank Card Ass'n 19 7 decision. Here, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly decided that there must
be a showing of evidence that the challenged foreign conduct has
an anticompetitive effect on United States commerce before an
American court may exercise jurisdiction.
In the Interbank case, the National Bank of Canada sought to
enjoin the Interbank Card Association, an American firm, and the
Bank of Montreal from carrying out a decision to terminate Na-
tional Bank's "Master Charge" credit card business. The National
Bank argued that the revocation of its right to use the Master
Charge trademark would exclude it from competition for Canadian
credit cardholders and merchant accounts in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.198
The issue to be decided was whether the termination of Na-
tional Bank as a Master Charge bank in Canada could have any
anticompetitive effects on United States commerce. The court held
that National Bank failed to establish the linkage between the be-
havior objected to and any anticompetitive consequences to United
States commerce.19 9 In making this determination, the court
195. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN BA ASSOCIATION, PRSMPECTIVES ON THE ExTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
197. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
198. Id. at 8-9.
199. Id. at 8.
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stated:
Building upon the fundamental "effects" test outlined by Judge
Learned Hand in [Alcoa], we think the inquiry should be di-
rected primarily toward whether the challenged restraint has, or
is intended to have, any anticompetitive effect upon United
States commerce, either commerce within the United States or
export commerce from the United States .... To us the criti-
cal factor in deciding this case is that appellants have not shown
that enforcement of the exclusivity provision of the license
agreement is at all likely to have an anticompetitive effect upon
American commerce, either foreign or interstate. 00
The court recognizes an essential matter worthy of note. In an
interdependent world economy, any act necessarily has some effect
virtually anywhere, yet the Sherman Act cannot be said to govern
all conduct having some mere consequence on United States com-
merce. In this regard, the Interbank court stated:
Our jurisdiction is not supported by every conceivable re-
percussion of the action objected to on United States commerce.
Only those injuries to United States commerce which reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompeti-
tive acts made possible by the violation constitute effects suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction . . . . While the anticompetitive ef-
fects must be shown to outweigh any procompetitive effects in
order to establish liability, there must be at least some anticom-
petitive effects to meet the threshold requirement of
jurisdiction. 01
The court concluded that the possible consequences resulting
from the elimination of National Bank of Canada's credit card
business due to defendant's actions failed to amount to the requi-
site anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce to invoke the court's
jurisdiction. The court also noted that the potential consequences
of the cancellation of the plaintiff's license, such as decreased prof-
its for Canadian merchants required to pay higher fees on their
accounts due to the increase in the Canadian credit card market
concentration, and/or fewer Canadian credit cardholders, would
not suffice to show an anticompetitive effect on the United
States. 02 The court concluded that there was no showing that any
200. Id.




significant number of United States firms doing business in Ca-
nada clear their credit card sales paper through Canadian banks,
or that even if they did so, they would be unable, to use United
States banks for that service.20
There was also nothing to show that a decline in Canadian
credit cardholders, who may purchase goods and services in the
United States, would have an anticompetitive effect on U.S. com-
merce. The court pointed out that the plaintiff failed to claim that,
as a result of increased concentration, Canadian purchases in the
United States "would not be made on cash terms, or on other
credit terms, if, due to the enforcement of [National Bank's] li-
cense agreement, credit cards were unavailable to some of these
purchasers."2 4
In stating its anticompetitive effects test, the Second Circuit
specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's test for jurisdiction as
enunciated by Judge Choy in Timberlane.20  Timberlane adopted
a "jurisdictional rule of reason." The Timberlane test has received
attention for specifically introducing the notion of comity into a
jurisdiction analysis. Judge Choy's three-part test is as follows:
[1] Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect,
the foreign commerce of the United States? [2] Is it of such a
type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the
Sherman Act? [3] As a matter of international comity and fair-
ness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States
be asserted to cover it?20'
Timberlane involved an American lumber company
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
206. Id. at 615. In discussing the issue of international fairness and comity, the third
prong of the test, the court listed seven elements to consider when determining if an asser-
tion of jurisdiction is proper. They include:
The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compli-
ance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614 (citing RESTATEMENT (SscoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 40).
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(Timberlane) which unsuccessfully attempted to establish a base of
operations in Honduras for the purpose of milling lumber and ex-
porting it to the United States. Timberlane claimed to establish
the base due to an alleged conspiracy between the Bank of
America and other parties designed to prevent Timberlane from
operating in Honduras.0 7 The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit after the district court dismissed the complaint in part for a
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Judge Choy concluded that the
district court erred because it only considered whether the re-
straint involved had "a direct and substantial effect on American
foreign commerce." 08 Thus, the Judge presented his tripartite
test.
e2 0
The serious problem with Timberlane is that Judge Choy
should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the
second prong of his test. Proper analysis would have indicated that
any effect on United States commerce was not "of such a type and
207. Id. at 604-05. Some of the specific allegations regarding the conspiracy are that: (1)
Timberlane purchased a substantial interest in an existing lumber mill owned by the Lima
family, one of three principal competitors in the Honduran lumber business; (2) a subsidiary
of the Bank of America had significant financial interests in both of Lima's rivals, and (3)
the struggling Lima enterprise was heavily indebted to this bank which the plaintiff alleges
had been conspiring with the two competitors by eliminating Lima and Timberlane from
milling and exporting lumber. This last element was allegedly done by refusing to refinance
Lima's debt, refusing to sell the bank's interests in the mill to Timberlane, conveying the
bank's claims to Lima's rivals for questionable consideration, and using Honduran courts
and other means by the conspirators to force Timberlane to cease operations. Id. at 603-05.
208. Id. at 615.
209. Judge Choy's contribution to jurisdictional tests influenced the American Law In-
stitute in its definition regarding jurisdiction and antitrust law. Section 415 of the THIRD
RESTATrMENT, entitled "Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities" provides as
follows:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is
carried out in significant measure in the United States, are subject to the juris-
diction to prescribe of the United States, regardless of the nationality or place of
business of the parties of the agreement or of the participants in the conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside
of the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade
that is carried out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the
jurisdiction of prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the con-
duct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and
the agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or
conduct have substantial effect on the commerce of the United States and the
exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 415.
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magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman
Act." Thus, the court should have restrained itself from consider-
ing the third question involving comity.
On remand, the lower court in Timberlane IP10 correctly dis-
missed the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction. The district
court employed the language of Interbank to support the notion
that jurisdiction is not supported by every conceivable repercus-
sion on U.S. commerce, "even if occasioned by the most reprehen-
sible business torts, '211 because only anticompetitive effects suffice
to confer jurisdiction.2 12
Interestingly, the court in Timberlane II did not directly ad-
dress Judge Choy's jurisdictional factors. Nonetheless, the court
did undertake a comparative interest analysis of relevant factors in
the "extraterritorial" application of antitrust laws. This analysis
seems to fall under prong three of Judge Choy's test. The language
used, however, and the findings of the court, suggests that the
analysis would be proper as a straightforward "substantive an-
ticompetitive effects" inquiry under Judge Hand's test in Alcoa.
Under this type of inquiry, dismissal of the complaint for a lack of
prescriptive jurisdiction would be appropriate due to the absence
of the requisite effect in the United States. To illustrate, the dis-
trict court stated:
In this case, the tortious conduct of which the plaintiffs
complain occurred in Honduras. Were this simply a straight-for-
ward tort complaint, the only legitimate choice of law would be
Honduran . . . . [T]he directly anticompetitive effect of the
Bank's decision to liquidate Lima's indebtedness was felt in the
marketplace in which the Lima assets supplied lumber: Hondu-
ras and, to a far less degree, the Caribbean . . .. [A]ny effect
that Lima's demise had upon competitive conditions in the U.S.
foreign [sic] was de minimis.
210. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 574
F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
211. Id. at 1463.
212. Id. With regard to this point, the court stated:
It appears to this Court, upon reviewing all the evidence in this matter, that this
lawsuit-essentially a group of separate tort actions which were deemed unsuc-
cessful in Honduran courts-has been repackaged as an antitrust case in an at-
tempt to subvert prudent and traditional limits upon applications of our laws to
foreign conduct and actors. We commend plaintiffs for their perseverance and
indefatigable enthusiasm, as well as their building the quintessential Trojan
horse from the ashes of their aborted investment in Honduras.
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Unlike the first prong of the Timberlane test, in this in-
quiry the weight, as opposed to the mere existence, of the com-
merce is significant. The minimal commercial opportunity for
Honduran lumber in the U.S. is important to our assessment of
whether the Bank's actions could have been intentionally di-
rected at, or their effect predictable upon, U.S. commerce in
lumber. 18
Of equal importance, the ninth circuit examined significant ec-
onomic factors in Timberlane III"2 and found the actual effect of
Timberlane's potential operations on the United States foreign
commerce to be insubstantial. The analysis was, however, mis-
placed into the third prong of Judge Choy's test. The court found
that "[t]he insignificance of the effect on the foreign commerce of
the United States when compared to the substantial effect in Hon-
duras 'suggests federal jurisdiction should not be exercised." 215
More appropriately, the court should have stated that due to the
insignificant effect in the United States, federal jurisdiction cannot
be exercised. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the ob-
jective territorial principle of international law.
In its analysis of the relevant economic factors which war-
ranted the dismissal of the complaint, the ninth circuit compared
Honduran lumber imports to both United States imports and total
United States lumber consumption. Expressed as a percentage of
total U.S. lumber imports, Honduran lumber imports constituted
.07 percent, .02 percent, and .04 percent in volume for the years
1970-1972, respectively.2 16 During the same years, such imports
formed an even smaller percentage of total U.S. lumber consump-
tion. The percentage of volume was .011 percent, .004 percent, and
.008 percent, respectively21
7
Given the small market share enjoyed by the Honduran lum-
ber industry in the U.S. market, any restraints imposed in the
Timberlane case could not produce the supra-competitive pricing
benefits to the conspirators and the anticompetitive effect on U.S.
foreign commerce required for the proper exercise of jurisdiction.
Another example of a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction on the
213. Id. at 1470.
214. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 749
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
215. Id. at 1384.
216. Id. at 1385.
217. Id.
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ground that the restraints involved did not have the requisite
"substantive anticompetitive effect" is the case of Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 218 This case involved a dis-
pute between two U.S. companies. Occidental Petroleum Corpora-
tion (Occidental) complained of the defendant's (Buttes)
instigation of an international dispute over the sovereign rights to
a portion of the Persian Gulf. Occidental alleged that this portion
of ocean area covered the richest area of a concession it obtained
from Umm Al Quywayn, one of the Trucial States, to explore, de-
velop, and exploit the petroleum reserves. The defendants' actions
allegedly prevented the plaintiffs from "enjoying the fruits of their
concession.
2 19
In defense of its behavior, Buttes, relies on language from the
1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws to assert that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the case.22 0 The standard for jurisdiction as set forth in that
study provides that activity unreasonably in restraint of trade has
a "substantive anticompetitive effect" on U.S. commerce. 221 To
justify its contention that Occidental failed to demonstrate such an
effect, Buttes emphasized the following economic factors: Its small-
ness in relation to the plaintiff (Occidental), the confined geo-
graphical area and speculative value of Occidental's concessions,
and the presence in the area of numerous other companies also ex-
tracting oil for importation into the United States.222
The district court, however, reasoned that to establish juris-
diction a plaintiff need only assert that the defendant's activity has
an effect on U.S. foreign commerce; the scope and degree of that
effect, which Buttes attempted to diminish by emphasizing eco-
nomic factors, is valuable only where the plaintiff seeks to estab-
lish a Sherman Act violation. 22 Through its application of a
mechanical jurisdictional test, the court improperly exercised juris-
diction, in contravention of the standards set forth in Alcoa and
international law.2 4
218. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
219. 331 F. Supp. at 95.
220. Id. at 102.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 103.
223. Id.
224. There may be a justification for the use of U.S. antitrust law to apply to the bla-
tantly predatory activity, for example, of American firms where there is not an arguable
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Like the court in Occidental, the court in Fleischmann Distil-
ling Corp. v. Distillers Co.,228 misconstrues Alcoa's effects test. In
Fleischmann, two U.S. distributors of imported Black & White
brand Scotch whiskey claimed that defendant British Distillers
(Distillers) terminated plaintiff's long-standing distributorships as
part of a conspiracy between Distillers and its subsidiaries in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 6 The court denied the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss and also denied a motion for summary
judgment based on the same claims.2 27
The court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
under the circumstances, the plaintiff was relieved of the necessity
for explicit allegations.228 When a change in a distributorship, such
as that which occurred here, furthers a horizontal conspiracy to
boycott, a conspiracy to fix prices, or a conspiracy to establish mar-
ket dominance or monopoly, such practices are per se illegal and
eliminate the requirement of explicit allegations. 229 Thus, although
Fleischmann failed to allege that the termination of the distribu-
torship agreements restrained scotch whiskey competition in the
United States, the complaint withstood the motion to dismiss.
The Fleischmann court's application of the per se rule is in-
consistent with the Alcoa decision. Judge Hand tailored the per se
rule for circumstances where foreign defendants abroad allegedly
violated the Sherman Act by affecting U.S. foreign commerce.23 0 In
this situation, Judge Hand's test transforms the conclusive pre-
sumption of market power to a rebuttable presumption, allowing
the defendant the opportunity to prove that he lacks such
power.2 31 Rather than allow Distillers the opportunity to prove
that it lacked power over price, the court ascribed such power to
the defendant.23 2 Furthermore, for the policy reasons discussed
foreign policy interest in the matter. In this narrow hypothetical context, the Sherman Act
could serve as an extended body of commercial tort law since its enforcement would not
offend any foreign government's or party's interest. Jurisdiction in this instance would be
based on the widely recognized international law principle of nationality.
225. 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
226. Id. at 226.
227. Id. at 221.
228. Id. at 226.
229. Id.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04, 146-47.
231. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
232. Fleischmann, 395 F. Supp. at 224. The court noted that Black & White Scotch was
the leading seller in the United States from 1939 to 1953. Between 1959 and 1972, however,
shipments fell by over 54% while total imports into the United States rose by over 185%.
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above regarding the application of the per se rule to cases involv-
ing international matters," ' courts should not so easily dispense
with the Alcoa requirement that a defendant be afforded the op-
portunity to prove that it does not have the power to impose the
costs of monopoly upon the United States.
Thus, given the defendant's lack of market control in the
United States, the Fleischmann case represents another instance
where jurisdiction was exercised contrary to the principles of inter-
national law and the requirements of Judge Hand's "effects" test.
Of the many Fifth Circuit appeals decisions the case of Indus-
trial Investment Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,2 3 4 presents, yet an-
other stark example, of an improper exercise of jurisdiction. This
case primarily involved a claim by a U.S. plaintiff, Industrial In-
vestment Development Corporation (IID) against a Japanese de-
fendant, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui), and its American subsidiary.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to keep IID out
of the business of harvesting trees in Indonesia and exporting lum-
ber to the United States in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.235
IID had entered into a joint venture agreement with an Indo-
nesian firm (Telaga Mas) in order to exploit a timber concession
granted to Telaga Mas by the Indonesian government. " " Telaga
Mas and IID negotiated a forestry agreement with the government
which provided that the lumbering concession would be termi-
nated for the failure of the joint venture to cooperate or carry out
its duties prior to the issuance of a "cutting" license.2 37 Before the
license was issued, Mitsui allegedly usurped control of Telaga Mas
for the self-serving purpose of destroying IID's interest in the con-
cession. 238 ID characterizes the conspiracy as having been inspired
by an increase in the world price of lumber. 3 9 When the new Mit-
sui-influenced management refused to cooperate with IID, the gov-
ernment cancelled the forestry agreement and terminated the
concession.24 o
Id.
233. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
234. 855 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1988).
235. 594 F.2d 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1979).




240. Industrial, 594 F.2d at 50.
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In support of its antitrust claim, IID argued that the defend-
ants' allegedly wrongful acts impaired its ability to enter and com-
pete in the market, and deprived it both of its contract and conces-
sion rights and the profits it would have derived from such
operations.2 41 Aside from the view that "substantive anticompeti-
tive effects" are required for jurisdiction in cases such as these, the
weakness in IID's position is that it fails to allege that the defend-
ant's actions resulted in any impact on United States commerce.
Matters such as market power and effects were not addressed. In
effect, IID raised the Sherman Act to protect itself from a Japa-
nese firm's allegedly unfair business practices rather than showing
that the conduct harmed the competitive structure of the United
States lumber market. This case arguably fails to meet even Dean
Rahl's mechanical jurisdiction test,242 yet the court denied the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss.243
Despite a jury finding that Mitsui was guilty of attempted and
actual monopolization and restraint of trade, it found, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, that Mitsui's activities lacked a direct and
substantial effect on United States import commerce.2"
It is noteworthy that Mitsui offered testimony which would be
quite relevant under the fifth step of the jurisdictional analysis
proposed in the Merger Guidelines 245 where once market concen-
tration has been determined as significant, an inquiry into other
economic factors regarding monopolistic tendencies is made. An
analysis of economic factors such as the degree of difference be-
tween the product in question and the next-best substitute and the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the relevant product, for example,
could help determine whether an imposed restraint might affect
the exercise of market power and the exaction of a supra-competi-
tive price."6 Under such analysis, the following Mitsui testimony
demonstrates that its activity in Indonesia did not have a "sub-
stantive anticompetitive effect" on United States foreign com-
merce despite the plaintiff's claim that it intended to specifically
import "agathis" logs into the United States:
"[A]gathis is highly substitutable with numerous hard woods and
241. Id. at 54.
242. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
243. 594 F.2d at 56.
244. Mitsui, 855 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1988).
245. See supra note 181-87 and accompanying text.
246. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 180-92, at 20,562.
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soft woods that are grown in, and exported from the United States
. . . . Agathis neither is nor would be imported into the United
States, and even if agathis were imported into the United States, it
would constitute an insignificant percentage of the market. '24 7
A survey of recent cases indicates that an increase in its atten-
tion to economic factors has led United States courts to hold that
in certain foreign or partly foreign trade situations, the courts do
not have jurisdiction due to the lack of an anticompetitive effect
on United States commerce.
The plaintiff in Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun Co.,2 48 claimed
that the defendant's refusal to deliver a quantity of North Sea
crude oil as contracted allegedly due to an Arab oil boycott, was a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.249 The court found that
the plaintiff's following allegations did not sufficiently show, with-
out the support of relevant and reliable economic information, that
there was an anticompetitive effect on United States commerce as
required by the Interbank2 50 case:
(a) the flow of crude oil in the foreign trade and commerce of
the United States has been burdened by the Defendants' com-
pliance with Arab Boycott;
(b) the availability of crude oil in the United States has been
affected by defendant's compliance with the Arab Boycott;
(c) plaintiff has been deprived of the benefits of free and open
competition; and
(d) plaintiff has been injured in its business by defendants' com-
pliance with the Arab Boycott.25'
Thus, the court recognized the legal notion that conclusory al-
legations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim.
In Eurim-Pharm v. Pfizer Inc.,2 52 the court held that it lacked
jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to establish that the de-
fendants' alleged foreign price-fixing and market allocation scheme
resulted in an anticompetitive effect on United States domestic or
import commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.2 "3 The plaintiff
247. 855 F.2d at 227.
248. 583 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
249. Id. at 1136.
250. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
251. 583 F. Supp. at 1137.
252. 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
253. Id. at 1107.
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alleged, and the court assumed to be true for purposes of the mo-
tion to dismiss, that Pfizer granted exclusive licenses to foreign
manufacturers for the antibiotic Vibramycin in major foreign mar-
kets. Under these licenses, the foreign manufacturers agreed with
Pfizer to restrict their sales of Vibramycin to distributors, whole-
salers, and jobbers. 25 4 The latter three groups would confine their
sales to specific geographical areas assigned by Pfizer, who would
also assign the prices.215 The plaintiff argued that as a result of this
scheme, Pfizer was able to maintain its substantial share of the
world market and charge an artificially high price for
Vibramycin,256 the results of which had a spillover effect on either
United States import or export commerce.2 5 In granting the de-
fendants' motion, the court stated that the "plaintiff has made no
allegations whatsoever regarding the manufacture, sale or market-
ing of Vibramycin in the United States other than its allegation
that the United States price has increased. Thus the link between
defendants' conduct abroad and the price of Vibramycin in the
United States is far from apparent." '258
The case of Papst Motoren GMbH & Co. KG v. Kanematsu-
Goshu (U.S.A.) Inc.,259 involved a claim where a Japanese firm was
accused of infringing on patents by selling computer motors to an-
other firm in Japan, who sold the motors to its American subsidi-
ary, which resold the products in the United States.260 The court
asserted that the fact that a foreign firm has never sold products in
the United States, nor ever had any specific plans to sell in the
United States is irrelevant as long as the alleged injurious conduct
has an anticompetitive effect on United States commerce.26 The
court denied jurisdiction over this claim, however, on the basis that
"[a]ny effect in the United States of Papst's alleged conduct . ..
would be, at most, de minimis," when the allegations lacked infor-
mation about, for example, the size of the relevant market and the
availability of substitute products.262
254. Id. at 1104.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1104. According to the plaintiff, the price of 500 capsules of 100 milligrams
of Vibramycin rose from $343.95 in 1981 to $550.64 in 1983, which represents more than a
38% increase when drug prices in general rose only 15% during the same period. Id. at 1106.
257. Eurim-Pharm, 593 F. Supp. at 1106.
258. Id. at 1107.
259. 629 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 868.
262. Id. at 869.
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Finally, in McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co.,26 the court held
that it lacked jurisdiction based on a finding that the plaintiff
failed to allege a sufficient effect on domestic commerce or import
trade.2 " This case involved an allegation of a Section 1 Sherman
Act violation. The plaintiff claimed to have been injured by the
defendants' termination of a contract which allowed the plaintiff to
promote the sale in Southeast Asia of "PB pipe grade resin" which
is used to manufacture piping designed to carry water. 265 The court
found that the most significant omission in the plaintiffs com-
plaint to have been its failure to allege injury to the PB and PB-
related product market or to competition in general.2 66 Without
such an allegation, the court is powerless to find the requisite
"substantive anticompetitive effect" for the proper exercise of ju-
risdiction under Judge Learned Hand's standard.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the Alcoa case and its "ef-
fects" test is consistent with the objective territorial principle of
international law. This is apparent when the opinion is read to re-
quire a "substantive anticompetitive effect" on U.S. foreign com-
merce. Actual proof of such an effect caused by foreigners abroad
must be shown in order for a court to properly exercise prescrip-
tive jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Thus, a constituent ele-
ment of the alleged antitrust offense charged must occur in the
United States as it did in the Alcoa case; otherwise, the Sherman
Act takes on the character of an overextended body of commercial
tort law.
The United States courts should adopt the 1984 Department
of Justice Merger Guidelines' standards in prescriptive jurisdic-
tional inquiries in order to determine the issue of whether suffi-
cient "effects" exist to apply the Sherman Act to foreign conduct.
Proper application of such Guidelines would ensure that jurisdic-
tional exercises in antitrust cases involving transnational activity
conform to the requirements of the Alcoa test and international
law.
263. 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).
264. Id. at 812.
265. Id. at 805.
266. Id. at 812.
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